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Sunday, January 31, 2010
CIA May Set Its Drone Sights on Anwar Awlaki
Interesting -- and significant -- story in the Washington Post today. Radical imam Anwar Alwaki -- an American citizen -- may soon be added to the CIA's drone target list.
Much ado has been made about the fact that this would be the first time an American has been targeted -- although as I have noted elsewhere, it would not be the first time an American Jihadist was killed in a drone attack. In 2002, a U.S. drone strike in Yemen (as it happens) killed Kamal Derwish, a Buffalo native connected to the Lackawanna Six.
It was reported earlier that the U.S. may have missed an opportunity to kill Awlaki due to wrangling over the legalities that his citizenship may or may not complicate. The questions include:
What standard of evidence gets you on the kill list?
Who reviews that decision?
Do you (as a citizen) have any recourse to get off of the list?
These are not idle questions. In at least one case, U.S.-aligned forces killed an Al Qaeda suspect whose terrorist credentials were (at the least) questionable. That person wasn't a U.S. citizen, but it's still a troubling precedent. What if Eliot Ness has simply whacked Al Capone?
The kill list is -- currently -- about two dozen names long. Most of them are active in command and control of terrorist attacks. While there are strong reasons to suspect Awlaki falls into that category, extremely significant unanswered questions remain -- not only about his role in the Detroit Christmas bomb attempt and the Nidal Hasan massacre, but about his connection to September 11.
Realistically, the only way most of those questions are ever going to be answered in the public sphere is if Awlaki is captured and returned to the U.S. for a trial. As I have mentioned before, trials are the public's most important window into Al Qaeda and how terrorism works. And there is no case we need to understand more than 9/11.
It looks like there will changes in procedures and discipline for those who failed to spot problems that could have prevented the murder spree of Nidal Hasan, the Army major who shot and killed 13 people in November. The missed warning signs included Hasan's obsession with U.S. wars as "wars against Islam" and his contacts with radical Al Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar Awlaki.
Contrast that to the handling of Ali Mohamed, Al Qaeda's last big conquest within the military. Mohamed infiltrated the U.S. military on orders from Al Qaeda's No. 2 leader Ayman Al Zawahiri. Some of his commanding officers sent up alarm bells about Mohamed's radical leanings (including statements made on the video below which was distributed by the military to educate soldiers about the Middle East).
No one was disciplined and nothing was changed after Mohamed's spying on behalf of Al Qaeda was exposed, a failure that spanned both Republican and Democratic administrations. The Pentagon even stonewalled requests by the CIA for information about foreign nationals serving in the armed forces after Mohamed's duplicity was finally exposed in 1998.
Accountability is an important tool in dealing with terrorism, because accountability leads to adaptability, which is our enemy's greatest strength. It's a lesson that could be applied even more broadly in the U.S. government, but a good start is a good start.
Awlaki said he met Nidal Hasan nine years ago, at the Dar Al-Hijra mosque in Washington, D.C. Hasan began emailing Awlaki again on Dec. 17, 2008, almost a year before Hasan shot and killed 13 people at Fort Hood.
The pressing question for American counterterrorism officials has been: Should those messages have alerted U.S. intelligence that Hasan was a threat? Awlaki's answer to the question of the message content certainly suggests the answer was "Hell, yes."
He was asking whether killing American officers and soldiers is legitimate or not. [...] I am surprised where were the U.S. security agencies, which claimed one day that they are able to read cars and vehicles plate's numbers from up in space, anywhere in the world. His messages were asking about the Islamic rule of killing a Muslim soldier, who served in the U.S. Army.
And in other letters he explained his view of killing Israeli civilians and was in favor of this, he mentioned the legal and factual justifications for targeting Jews with rockets. Later, there were some of his letters that asked for a way he can transfer some funds to us, to contribute on charity works.
More broadly, Awlaki said:
An American-Muslim's loyalty is to the Muslim nation, not for America. Hasan has proved that, through his blessed operation; may God richly reward him.
Detroit Bomber Attended AlMaghrib Institute In Houston During 2008
The Christmas Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attended a Houston-based Islamic seminar in 2008, according to the Detroit Free Press. He was in Houston for 17 days.
With the caveat that I don't want to read too much into this, it's interesting to note that American Jihadist Daniel Maldonado was a member of the AlMaghrib Institute's Internet forum using his online handle of Daniel Aljughafi. At the time of his arrest, he had only made two posts to the site. Oddly, one of those posts has since disappeared.
Threads of interest on the AlMaghrib site include:
UPDATE: Internet Haganah has an extremely good post which sheds further light on Maldonado's connections to AlMaghrib and AlMaghrib's connection to other points of extremist interest on the Web.
Intercepts and other information point to connections between terrorism suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Anwar al Awlaki -- who also communicated with the accused U.S. Army gunman in last month's attack on Ft. Hood, Texas, that left 13 people dead.
Some of the information about Awlaki comes from Abdulmutallab, the 23-year-old Nigerian charged with attempting to detonate a hidden packet of PETN explosive aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, the officials said.
Under questioning by the FBI, Abdulmutallab has said that he met with Awlaki and senior Al Qaeda members during an extended trip to Yemen this year, and that the cleric was involved in some elements of planning or preparing the attack and in providing religious justification for it, officials said.
Other intelligence linking Awlaki to Abdulmutallab became apparent after the attempted bombing, including communications intercepted by the National Security Agency indicating that the cleric was meeting with "a Nigerian" in preparation for some kind of operation, according to a U.S. intelligence official.
A senior American counterterrorism official confirmed that American and allied authorities are looking closely into Mr. Abdulmutallab’s possible connections to radical elements in Yemen, including extremist figures on Jihadist Web sites like Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical cleric linked to Maj. Nidal M. Hasan, the suspect in the Fort Hood shootings last month. Investigators are trying to determine whether Mr. Awlaki may have motivated Mr. Abdulmutallab.
UPDATE: Some later stories have been downplaying this possibility, but I'm in a wait-and-see mode. The Detroit attack appears to be well in keeping with Awlaki's "leaderless jihad" philosophy in which individuals carry out attacks with minimal guidance from headquarters. It is, of course, a critical question as to what organizational affiliation Abdulmutallab had and how strong it was. If this attack turns out to have a strong Al Qaeda component, I will have a lot to say about what that means for the future of the war on terror.
The government of Yemen seems to think that an air strike has killed Anwar Awlaki, the American citizen turned radical imam who was a spiritual leader to 9/11 hijackers, as well as Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan. The strike also supposedly killed a couple of important Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders. There have been plenty of false reports in the last year, so we'll wait a while to see how this pans out. Another ambiguity awaiting clarification -- did the U.S. play a role in the strike? If so, that sends a powerful message about this administration's tolerance for those who support terrorism. We will see.
12/25 UPDATE: Awlaki is reportedly still alive. Some of the stories out of Yemen said that his house (or what was believed to be his house) was specifically targeted in the strike. That question is an interesting one for the reason cited above. It speaks to the Obama administration's tolerance for terrorist supporters, and perhaps also to their definition -- as in, was Nidal Hasan's shooting spree terrorism?
"[Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan] had his struggles, and he embraced his religion with such intensity that one wondered whether he" could have suffered from a form of "delusion," the [Walter Reed] staffer said. He cited as an example -- without speaking of Hasan in particular -- the belief that the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are against Muslims rather than against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's government and then insurgents in Iraq.
The view that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are directed at Islam is not "delusional" -- it's the product of a selective worldview shaped by an overwhelming amount of public discourse from authority figures within the Muslim world, and to a lesser extent, the Muslim-American world.
This "War on Islam" concept is an major component of radical thought, although the opinion is so widespread that it's probably unreasonable to say it's outside the Muslim mainstream (on a worldwide basis).
The "delusion" comment betrays such a profound lack of understanding and attention to the global Muslim public square that it's easy to see how Hasan's colleagues could have missed more important signs of extremism.
And for those keeping score, one of Anwar Awlaki's more popular audio tracts is titled "It's a War Against Islam."
As the hours of coverage mount, we're seeing more and more discussion of Maj. Nidal Hasan's connection to extremist imam Anwar Aulaqi, prior to his killing spree at Fort Hood last week. There's a fundamental question that comes out of that analysis, which I have not seen articulated yet.
Was Hasan acting rationally when he killed 13 people?
Culturally, we tend to view mass shootings as a manifestation of mental illness, in which someone's unfathomable disease prompts them to act in an inexplicable way.
But when you look at Anwar Aulaqi's role and his comments on the shootings, we have to question that assumption.
Nidal Hassan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn't exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges.
One can certainly disagree with this sentiment, and one can challenge its factual underpinnings. But within the factual underpinnings, the statement is rational, which is to say it's based on recognizable reasoning.
So the key question regarding Nidal Hasan is: Were his actions based on this kind of reasoning, or the result of a collapse of reasoning due to mental illness?
Certainly his lawyers will be considering this question. It's a standard question in murder cases and bears directly on the punishment a convicted murderer receives.
In this instance, there's also a broader problem, because if he was acting rationally, it was likely the result of radicalization. In other words, did Aulaqi or like-minded thinkers bring Hasan around to a worldview in which his actions are considered rational?
If Hasan was a radicalized rational actor, his actions stem from the worldview of Anwar Aulaqi. Without such a motive, we're left only with his desire to avoid deployment, and the truly rational decision based on that motive would have been to desert the Army without killing anyone.
If Hasan was rational, the case raises enormous concerns about the success of ideologues like Aulaqi. Because -- unlike mental illness -- ideology is contagious.
To some extent, of course, the point is moot. The media depiction is increasingly focused on Hasan's ideology. If those who share his ideological inclinations believe he was acting rationally, it will inspire imitators. But understanding if and how ideology influenced the initial act helps us understand how this worldview spreads, who is susceptible to its charms, and what factors cause ideology to transform into violent intent.
A radical-leaning English-language Islamic forum discussing Aulaqi and Hasan was heavily populated by people who found the shootings quite rational:
Despite his motives, Muslims all over the world are celebrating and they would've been happy even if a kafir did this. Thirteen less kuffar [infidels] who would otherwise quite possibly have raped your Muslim sisters and/or killed them and other Muslims. [...]
Imam Anwar Awlaki has spoken the truth again and the hypocrites have been exposed. May Allah preserve him and continue to make him a beacon of truth for this Ummah and a cancer against the Kuffar no matter how much they may dislike it. Ameen. [...]
my point was that, there lies a great disconnect between muslims and their actions and reactions as dictated by the media[.] the same type of attack that happens in afghanistan and iraq daily, and there are no condemnations[.] we dont get small biographies, photos, names, etc, we get a headline and we move on[.] here, an attack was made (whether he was sane or not, or whatever his motivation) and we have people clamoring over the fact that 13 innocent people were killed[.] i fail to see that in this story[.] and i am not talking about the kuffar and their responses, i can understand their responses[.] i am more concerned about the muslims and their responses [...]
When the other party has murdered millions of Muslims...(need I continue with this?) would it not be better, since one is not bound by any oath, treaty or covenant, to do what nidal did [instead of just leaving the Army]? Why waste a golden opportunity like this? [...]
Nidals "treachery" + attack = 13 less soldiers going out to kill more members of our ummah
Whether you like it or not, whether you agree with it or not, the concept of "13 less soldiers" fighting against those perceived as "our ummah (community)" is rational. It may be based on false assumptions or wrong facts or unattractive values, but it's a logical rationale that justifies the act. The fact that this particular audience would be as likely to cheer someone who opened fire in a mall is (somewhat) tangential to the point.
If the worldview and reasoning of Anwar Aulaqi is gaining traction in the United States, that's a real problem for law enforcement and intelligence officials. Aulaqi is an advocate of the radical Islamic version of "leaderless resistance" in which individuals and very small groups take action against perceived enemies independently. That's a very difficult problem in counterterrorism.
9/11 Imam Anwar Aulaqi Praises Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Malik Hasan
Anwar Aulaqi, a radical imam who served as inspiration to Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan and two 9/11 hijackers, has posted to his Web site with words of praise for the Army major:
Nidal Hassan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn't exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges.
Further down, he states:
[T]he only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.
The heroic act of brother Nidal also shows the dilemma of the Muslim American community. Increasingly they are being cornered into taking stances that would either make them betray Islam or betray their nation. Many amongst them are choosing the former. The Muslim organizations in America came out in a pitiful chorus condemning Nidal's operation. [...]
The inconsistency of being a Muslim today and living in America and the West in general reveals the wisdom behind the opinions that call for migration from the West. It is becoming more and more difficult to hold on to Islam in an environment that is becoming more hostile towards Muslims.
Anwar Aulaqi is a Jihadist ideologue based in America prior to September 11, who was linked to some of the hijackers. He currently lives in Yemen. Although not an American citizen, he is a pertinent figure promulgating jihadist in the U.S., and therefore he's a figure of interest in the context of American citizen jihadists.
2001-09-15: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Anwar Aulaqi
Last week, the Washington Post reported that the FBI "now" believes radical imam Anwar Aulaqi -- who befriended 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi -- knowingly aided Al Qaeda. The investigative background for this belief was substantial and isn't exactly new. INTELWIRE has obtained several FBI investigative documents related to Aulaqi, including the document linked below:
2001-10-23: FBI Communication, Anwar Aulaqi, Dar El Hijra mosque
Last week, the Washington Post reported that the FBI "now" believes radical imam Anwar Aulaqi -- who befriended 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi -- knowingly aided Al Qaeda. The investigative background for this belief was substantial and isn't exactly new. INTELWIRE has obtained several FBI investigative documents related to Aulaqi, including the document linked below:
Last week, the Washington Post reported that the FBI "now" believes radical imam Anwar Aulaqi -- who befriended 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi -- knowingly aided Al Qaeda. The investigative background for this belief was substantial and isn't exactly new. INTELWIRE has obtained several FBI investigative documents related to Aulaqi, including the document linked below:
